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“Hardly any question arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner or 
later into a judicial question.” – Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States, rarely recognized as a national 
policymaker, plays a fundamental role in the creation of American public policy. The 
public does not often acknowledge the Court’s policymaking function, for the Justices are 
not elected by popular vote. The coordinate branches of government downplay the 
Court’s hand in shaping public policy, so that they may retain a strong semblance of the 
separation of powers. The Justices themselves, particularly in Senate hearings to confirm 
their nomination, foreswear the very idea of engaging in policymaking while sitting on 
the bench. America has deceived itself into believing that courts are, to a significant 
degree, removed from the policymaking process. Yet in reality, judges from the highest 
to the lowest court in the land engage in public policymaking on a daily basis, merely by 
exercising the function of judicial review.  
At least since Justice Marshall’s Marbury v. Madison (1803) opinion, courts have 
used judicial review as justification for declaring legislative enactments null and void. A 
judge’s ability to rule on the constitutionality of a statute  “is not simply a matter of 
measuring a statute against crisply defined constitutional provisions but, rather, a policy-
making process, in which judges engage after the legislators.”1 Judicial review thus 
becomes not just a check on legislative and executive power, but the final stage in a 
policy-making process where the judiciary has the chance to “substitute its own program 
                                                
1 Bickel, Alexander M. The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 36.  
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for a popularly sponsored one that it finds constitutionally deficient.”2 The popular notion 
that courts have a limited role to play in public policymaking cannot be sustained. Judges, 
whether we like it or not, possess a significant measure of policymaking capacity, and as 
de Tocqueville observed, most policy disputes inevitably find their way to the courtroom.  
 Assuming that judges do create public policy, the central question for political 
scientists and legal scholars becomes: when is judicial policymaking most appropriate? In 
other words, under what conditions is judicial intervention in the policymaking process 
conducive to an enduring policy solution? 
   Many scholars have offered answers, often simplistic ones. For some, the 
judiciary is never well-equipped to create effective public policy, given their relative 
isolation from the public when compared to elected representatives. Unlike the other 
branches, judges have few tools to gauge public opinion on a given policy, no formal 
pathway to social or technical information besides what is provided in case briefs and 
witness testimonies, and little incentive to conform to the democratic will of the people. 
Furthermore, the judicial branch lacks any sort of mechanism to enforce its own policies. 
Courts can impose fines, they can condemn criminals to prison, but in the realm of 
policymaking, courts depend on legislatures to enact laws conforming to judicial policy 
and on executive officials to ensure those polices are carried out. Without the power to 
punish non-compliance or create organizations of oversight, courts face a heightened 
challenge when they attempt to enforce policies, the legitimacy of which is already 
                                                
2 Choper, Jesse H. Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the 




questioned. Limited by the boundaries of public acceptance and inter-branch cooperation, 
judicial intervention in policymaking is rightly questioned.    
 Other scholars consider the possibility that courts have institutional policymaking 
advantages that the other branches do not. For one, judges’ relative insulation from public 
opinion could be beneficial; judges may be more able to decide a case based on long-
standing principles rather than on the frantic public opinion of the moment. Some of the 
Supreme Court’s worst decisions occurred when the Court’s commitment to values such 
as the equal protection of the laws caved to public sentiment. The racial segregation 
imposed by Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and the Japanese internment camps erected by 
Korematsu v. U.S. (1944) tarnish the Court’s history. Courts also have the advantage of 
being able to tailor their policies to address concrete, specific disputes. If legislative 
statutes create general rules that apply to entire populations, then court decisions are 
“concerned with the flesh and blood of an actual case.”3 Judges can afford to be less 
concerned with the unintended repercussions of their decisions, so long as they take care 
to constrain their rulings to the facts of the case before them. Finally, the judiciary often 
has the benefit of being able to see legislative or executive policies in action before it is 
called on to create a policy of its own.  The court is able to witness first-hand the effects 
of a failed school integration plan, or the practices of a brutal prison system, and correct 
as needed. All of these factors contribute to what Justice Stone called “the sober second 
thought” provided by the courts.4 The structural deficiencies of courts non-withstanding, 
it must be conceded that judicial policymaking also has potential advantages.  
                                                
3 Bickel, supra note 1, at 26. 
4 Stone, H. F. “The Common Law in the United States,” Harvard Law Review 50 (1936): 4, 25 
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 I take the middle course between these two positions. Courts can create enduring 
public policy that sparks social change, and can even do a better job of it than the 
legislature, but only under tightly constrained conditions. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
judicial policymaking is appropriate only when courts possess adequate levels of 
policymaking capacity, complemented by heightened necessity of judicial intervention in 
a policy dispute. Stated differently, capacity + necessity = appropriateness. Capacity is 
defined as a court’s ability to create an informed and feasibly enforceable policy solution. 
Necessity is measured by the extent to which injured parties require judicial involvement 
in the policymaking process, normally reserved for the other branches. Appropriateness, 
the interplay of capacity and necessity, is operationalized as a court’s ability to produce 
enduring solutions to public policy problems.  
 A general discussion of judicial policymaking seems unlikely to draw fruitful 
conclusions. Instead, comparative case studies offer a useful way to test when judicial 
policymaking is most appropriate, and to sift out the common elements that correlate with 
more successful policies. Accordingly, I develop a holistic model based on the hypothesis 
that capacity + necessity = appropriateness. Each of these terms is further broken down 
into specific variables drawn from the scholarly judicial policymaking literature. I 
carefully illustrate the important features of the model by applying it to a broad range of 
policy areas, before testing it in an area that has escaped the scrutiny of scholars, namely, 
affirmative action policy in higher education institutions and in K-12 public schools. This 
comparative case study provides suggestive evidence as to when judicial policies provide 
effective race-based remedies in education specifically, and when judicial solutions to 




Three Approaches to Judicial Policymaking 
 
Three different schools of thought consider courts’ capacity to create and 
implement public policy. I use the terms formalism, alternativism, and realism to describe 
these three approaches, but the terms themselves are less important than the ideas they 




 A long-standing formalist approach to law marginalizes the role courts play in 
shaping public policy. Adhering to traditional notions of the separation of powers, 
mandating that courts use the power of judicial review to decide the legality of statutes 
instead of making policy, and fearful that judicially active courts will pose a threat to 
democracy, formalists caution courts not to overstep their bounds. For instance, in Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), the Supreme Court held that 
busing students to different schools was a constitutionally acceptable method of 
achieving racial integration in highly segregated public schools. Lino Graglia argues that 
the judicially imposed Swann policy “would not be tolerated by the American people” if 
it had been advanced by the “avowedly political institutions of American government.”5 
If a legislature or a public school board had advanced the unpopular busing policy, public 
discontent would have clamped down on the policy or voted the responsible officials out 
of office. The Court’s involvement, however, transformed busing policy from a political 
                                                
5 Graglia, Lino A. Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools. (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976), 16.  
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to a legal dispute that left public opposition with few options: either comply or move to a 
new school district. To formalists, the Court’s participation in the political process and 
engagement in policy-making is an inexcusable violation of the separation of powers, 
because courts generally do not derive their power from the consent of the electorate. 
 A separate but related formalist argument is that courts not only lack the right to 
create public policy, but they lack the capacity to do so effectively.  Formalists point to 
judges’ misuse of social science evidence and to their lack of enforcement mechanisms as 
the two primary faults in judicial policymaking. Grounding judicial policies in the 
findings of social scientists becomes problematic, not only because judges are expected 
to base their decisions on constitutional or statutory law, but also because judges risk 
misunderstanding or leaning too heavily on such findings. For example, the Brown court 
has been criticized for basing its decision on evidence that is “no more ‘scientific’ that 
the evidence presented in favor of racial prejudice.”6 The Brown case also illustrates the 
courts’ inability to enforce its own decisions, for the judiciary was unable to achieve any 
significant degree of racial integration without help from the other branches. Even a 
decade after the Brown decision, only one in a hundred Southern black children attended 
desegregated schools.7 Clearly, courts struggle to effectuate real social change when 
                                                
6 Van den Haag, Ernest. “Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases- A Reply to Professor 
Kenneth Clark.” Villanova Law Review 6 (1960): 78.  
7 Rosenberg, Gerald N. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University 
of Chicago, 1991), 52. See also Bickel, Alexander M. “The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and 
Prospects.” Columbia Law Review 2 (1964), 214. Even in 1962, roughly 70 percent of black high school 
students and 85 percent of black elementary school students went to schools “whose student bodies were 90 
to 100 percent Negro.” 
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acting independently from the other branches.8 Formalists, then, assert that judicial 
policymaking is both inappropriate and ineffective. 
Alternativism 
 
 The second approach to judicial policymaking allows room for the judiciary to 
create and implement public policy by suggesting that courts offer an alternative path for 
those groups seeking to push policy goals through the legislature or executive 
bureaucracy. Alternativists argue that minority, unpopular, unorganized or under-
resourced groups lack the means to make their political voice heard in a purely 
democratic system, and that they find refuge in an adjudication system more concerned 
with their legal rights than with their political ideas.9 Alternativism maintains that judges 
can and should make public policy to protect the rights and hear the voices of 
disenfranchised groups, despite the fact that judicial decisions are not guaranteed to be 
democratically supported or even effective.  
 Gordon Silverstein best encapsulates the alternativist approach, suggesting that 
groups will turn to the judiciary when confronted by institutional and political barriers in 
the other branches.10 Silverstein illustrates his point with the example of prison reform. 
Although Congress was well aware of the fact that many prisons were in need of 
modernization in the 1960, no elected official was going to jeopardize their career by 
                                                
8 Baum, Lawrence. “The Influence of Legislatures and Appellate Courts over the Policy Implementation 
Process,” Policy Studies Journal 8 (1980): 561. 
9 Neier, Aryeh. Only Judgment: The Limits of Litigation in Social Change. (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1982), 9. “Since the early 1950s, courts have been the most accessible and, often, the 
most effective instrument of government for bringing about the changes in public policy sought by social 
protest movements.” 
10 Silverstein, Gordon. Law’s Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15. 
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urging voters to give their tax dollars to prisoners. As such, “the courts seemed to be a 
plausible and perhaps the only plausible path around severe political barriers.”11 The 
adjudication process, as a means of remedying perceived wrongs done to those with 
perceived rights, allows injured parties to circumvent a political process that often does 
not acknowledge those rights or wrongs because the political cost is simply too high. In 
the alternativist view, this distinguishing factor of courts makes judicial policymaking not 
only legitimate, but also, on occasion, highly appropriate.   
 Of course, judicial policymaking can be disastrous, even when it is necessary. In 
Baker v. Carr (1962), the Supreme Court sought to balance malapportioned state 
legislative districts under a “one-person, one-vote” policy. The injured parties, whose 
votes carried proportionately less weight than votes from other districts, had little chance 
of obtaining a remedy from the very legislators elected through this partisan 
gerrymandering. The judiciary offered the only alternative, yet courts were incompetent 
at enforcing their judgments and supervising the redrawing of districts, a task specifically 
assigned to the legislatures.12 Alternativism demonstrates that even when judicial 
intervention in policymaking is necessary, lackluster policymaking capacity can reduce 
the effectiveness of a judicial solution. 
Realism 
 
 Realists contend that, regardless of whether or not courts have the capacity or 
necessity to influence public policy, judges engage daily in policymaking just by 
                                                
11 Id. at 20 (emphasis in original). 
12 Zipkin, Saul. “Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State Legislature.” Columbia Law Review 103 
(2003): 383.  
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exercising judicial review. They concede that judges, in traditional formulations, are 
supposed to uphold the rule of law by interpreting pre-existing law or precedent, not 
create new policies.13 However, realists argue that this traditional notion is neither 
accurate nor applicable to modern government, because the modern administrative state 
is primarily concerned with creating new policy to address social issues. The reality is 
that “there is a substantial overlap between policy making and [legal] interpretation, and 
judges often engage in both modes of decision making within the same opinion.”14 
Divorcing courts entirely from policymaking, realism charges, denies courts their 
inherent power to “say what the law is.”15 
The past century tells a story of realist judicial policymaking. In its famous U.S. v. 
Carolene Products (1938) doctrine, the Supreme Court first hinted that minority groups 
may find reprieve from a majoritarian political system within an adjudication system that 
is constitutionally bound to ensure the equal protection of rights.16 Scholars awoke to the 
realization that courts routinely advance policies that protect the civil liberties of 
minorities and unpopular groups; subsequent decisions upholding the rights of 
criminals,17 students with dissident political views,18 and even hate speech groups19 
affirmed this realist belief. Scholars now agree that “deprived social groups have joined 
                                                
13 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases,” Harvard Law Review 88 (1975): 1058. 
14 Feeley, Malcolm M. and Edward L. Rubin. Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the 
Courts Reformed America’s Prisons. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7. 
15 Marbury v. Madison (1803), at 177. 
16 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) at 155, Footnote 4. 
17 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
18 Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) 
19 R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul (1992) 
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the advantaged in the march to the courthouse”20 and some go as far as to suggest that 
“courts offer the best hope to poor, powerless, and unorganized groups, those most often 
seeking significant social reform.”21 In the minds of these scholars, courts went from 
being a referee reviewing the constitutionality of government policy to entering the field 
itself as a major player. 
Yet it would be a mistake to suggest that courts only recently began shaping 
public policy. For instance, the Supreme Court had a hand in creating laissez-faire 
economic policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.22 In truth, courts 
have always engaged in policymaking, and realists have long acknowledged that judicial 
intervention in policymaking can act as a “substitute for politics.” 23 Acting on the realist 
assumption that courts mandate “not only what government [can] and [can] not do, but 
what it must do as well,”24 the question now becomes when courts are able to 
appropriately exercise this policymaking function. 
 
Summary ! Debates! over! the! normative! implications! of! judicial! policymaking! rage! on!between!realist,!alternativist,!and!formalist!scholars.!However,!I!bracket!that!debate!to! investigate! when! judicial! policymaking! is! most! appropriate.! In! the! following!section,!I!contribute!an!original!model!which!aims!to!identify!the!conditions!under!
                                                
20 Horowitz, Donald L. The Courts and Social Policy. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977), 11. 
21 Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 24. 
22 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York (1905). 
23 Judith Shklar, Legalism: Laws, Morals, and Political Trials, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1964, p. 17 
24 Silverstein, supra note 10, at 6. 
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which! the! judiciary! is! best>equipped! to! create! policy,! and! the! conditions! under!which! judicial! policymaking! is! most! necessary.! Taken! together,! these! conditions!enable!courts!to!appropriately!participate!in!public!policymaking.! 
 
Model: Judicial Policymaking 
Methods 
In this section, I develop an original model to answer the question: under what 
conditions is it appropriate for the courts to create public policy? Table 1, in the 
Appendix, is based on the formulation that appropriateness = capacity + necessity. 
Capacity is the judiciary’s ability to arrive at an informed and feasible solution to a 
policy problem. Necessity is the extent to which the judiciary is forced to intervene in a 
policy dispute, regardless of the court’s capacity to do so effectively. Appropriateness is 
the overall measure of whether judicial involvement in policymaking is conducive to 
policy solutions that stand the test of time. A subtle relationship connects these three 
considerations, further complicated by the fact that capacity and necessity are broken 
down into six different variables. While heightened capacity can compensate for a 
relative lack of necessity, and vice versa, judicial intervention in the policymaking 
process is most appropriate when both factors are at their peak.   
The y-axis of Table 1 breaks down both capacity and necessity into more specific 
variables used by many scholars to analyze various areas of court-sanctioned public 
policy. The four capacity variables are the main factors that directly influence the courts’ 
ability to create effective policy in their decisions. When these four variables are present, 
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the court’s ability to create legitimate and effective public policy in the given area should 
rise. The two necessity variables are the factors that require the courts to create policy 
(regardless of whether they have high capacity or not) because the other branches are 
either unwilling or unable to create policy to address the given problem. When both 
necessity variables are present, the court should be under greater pressure to create public 
policy, though not necessarily more equipped to take action. The variables selected are all 
firmly grounded in scholarly literature and can be easily identified when reviewing a 
policy’s history, but they have never, to my knowledge, been incorporated into a holistic 
model.   
The x-axis of Table 1 lists five different areas of public policy that are considered 
in the model. The five areas of public policy that I have selected do not represent all of 
the policy areas that the judiciary has become involved in. Rather, I sampled five judicial 
policies that have been squarely discussed in scholarly literature, and most of them are 
readily familiar to those with even a rudimentary knowledge of the courts. There is a bias 
is this sample, which reflects a bias in the scholarly literature: scholars interested in 
examining the appropriateness of judicial intervention in the policymaking process have 
not considered civil liberties under the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause, or 
the Second Amendment gun rights debate. Although these may be doctrinally difficult 
areas, the appropriateness of Court involvement in such disputes, and its ability to 
enforce its decisions, have not been questioned. Though I would bracket that concern as I 
work within the prevailing framework, including those areas in this model could shift the 
emphasis in how scholars understand judicial policymaking.  
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Within each area of public policy, all six variables are given a categorical ranking 
of low, moderate, or high. A low ranking means that the variable was not present or 
hardly at all present as a factor in the given policy area; a high ranking, just the opposite. 
Though I tried to avoid giving moderate rankings, they were given in cases where 
scholarly opinion on a policy was decidedly mixed.   
Finally, each policy area receives an aggregate appropriateness ranking. If 
appropriateness is high, I hypothesize that court intervention in policymaking will be 
conducive to an enduring policy solution. That is, courts will have both the capacity to 
resolve a policy dispute, and the necessity needed to make their verdicts legitimate.  If 
appropriateness is moderate, I predict that court decisions will solve some deficiencies in 
a public policy, but progress will be hampered because the courts overstepped their 
bounds, or fought prevailing public opinion, or some other reason. If appropriateness is 
low, I hypothesize that the courts would do better not to get involved. The courts will 
struggle to create policy solutions, the policy will be met with considerable resistance, 
and quite possibly, the policy will lead to counter-productive results.  
I now turn to a brief analysis of variable, illustrated with examples from the 
various policy areas.  
Assessing Judicial Policymaking  
Reframing the question of judicial policymaking from a normative debate to a 
question of judicial capacity, Donald Horowitz questioned not “whether the courts should 
perform certain tasks but whether they can perform them competently.”25 A wave of 
                                                
25 Horowitz, supra note 20, at 18. 
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scholarship has engaged this question, producing a disparate range of issues that can be 
unified into a holistic model to analyze judicial policymaking. This model, as laid out in 
Table 1, incorporates six elements drawn from scholarly literature: generalism, bi-
polarity, minimalism, legitimization, structural impediments, and public support. Some of 
these variables affect judicial policymaking capacity; when inherent in a judicial policy, 
the policy will be more effective and easier to enforce. Others affect the judicial 
policymaking necessity; when present, they pressure the court to create a policy. All six, 
however, ought to make judicial policymaking more appropriate in the eyes of the court, 
the litigants, the state, and general public. Appropriateness, a function of both capacity 
and necessity, is the overall measure of whether judicial intervention in the policymaking 
process is conducive to an enduring policy solution. 
The first variable considered is generalism. Most judges are “generalists” to the 
extent that they must hand down decisions on any case before them, even if they lack the 
social or technical knowledge required to make an informed policy decision.26 Often 
forced to rely on amicus briefs or expert witnesses to attain any specialized knowledge,27 
judges’ interpretation and use of such information in policy-making is heavily criticized. 
For example, courts attempting to create educational policy have been accused of 
“lack[ing] an awareness of the complex, multifaceted process of education” and 
“disregard[ing] the development of children the perspectives of families and 
                                                
26 Id. at 31 
27 Strum, Philippa. Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), 24. 
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communities.”28 Judges themselves admit as much.29 In education, as in any other 
specialized area of public policy, judges often lack both relevant social or technical 
information and the training to put such information to effective use. It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that judges’ policymaking capacity will rise when the case before them is 
general in nature – when it contains a minimum of social or technical information.30  
To understand the impact that generalism can have on a court decision, one need 
look no further than Brown v. Board of Education (1954). The Supreme Court’s reliance 
on socio-psychological studies in Brown, demonstrating the supposed psychological harm 
inflicted on black students by segregation, has been repeatedly challenged by those who 
would not have the constitutional rights of Americans rest on the “flimsy foundation” of 
questionable social science evidence.31 Although Chief Justice Warren stated that the 
adverse psychological effects of segregation were “amply supported”32 by such evidence, 
the Court’s decision was primarily grounded on congressional intent in writing the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and in basic moral considerations that negate the need for social 
                                                
28 Lightfoot, Sarah Lawrence. “Families as Educators: The Forgotten People of Brown.” Shades of Brown: 
New Perspectives on School Desegregation. (New York: Teachers College Press, 1980): 4. 
29 U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education (1966) at 855: “Most judges do not have sufficient 
competence- they are not educators or school administrators- to know the right questions, much less the 
right answers.”  
30 As a counterpoint, Lawrence Baum advocates that “the Court is a specialist” in that “the bulk of its 
decisions are made in a few policy areas,” namely economic policy and civil liberties. However, as the 
Court can only decide a given number of cases in a term, and the subject matter and circumstances of those 
cases changes each year, the Justices have little ability to develop any sort of expertise, even in the long 
term, in one policy area. Furthermore, there are innumerable disputes within the broad category of civil 
liberties, each requiring different background knowledge and a different policy solution. Baum, Lawrence. 
The Supreme Court (7th ed.) (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001) 185, 194. 
31 Ravitch, Diane. The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 
1983), 129. See also Newby, I.A. Challenge to the Court: Social Scientists and the Defense of Segregation 
1954-1966 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969).  
32 Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (1954) at 494. 
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science justifications.33 Intertwining morality with psychological studies, the Brown 
decision was moderately generalist. Had the Court abandoned its attempt to justify its 
decision with the social sciences, and instead focused solely on the legal and moral 
argument, desegregation’s critics would have been unable to question to the 
appropriateness of the decision. The inclusion of faulty social science evidence only gave 
critics a weapon to undermine the legitimacy of the Court’s decree. Justifying a decision 
through social sciences or technical information, then, reduces generalism and calls the 
courts’ capacity into question. 
 Bi-polarity, a term employed by Abram Chayes and the second variable 
considered, refers to disputes between two parties where one has wronged the other. 
Judges easily resolve such disputes by deciding the appropriate remedy owed to the 
injured party.34 The difficulty is that, in modern adjudication, many cases are not bi-polar 
but “multi-plural.” These lawsuits are “not a dispute between private individuals about 
private rights,” as Chayes puts it, “but a grievance about the operation of a public policy.” 
35 Such cases are brought to court by multiple groups, each alleging to have been injured 
by a public policy, thus frustrating the judge’s ability to assign blame or award damages. 
A multi-plural case involving a multitude of interested or injured parties, requiring the 
judge to balance the impact a court policy will have on each one, will necessarily make 
the policy-making process more difficult. A bi-polar case, by contrast, should raise the 
court’s capacity.  
                                                
33 “Many of the most dramatic civil rights questions depend so extensively on moral rather than factual 
reasoning that the technical competence of judges really does not seem relevant.” Carter, Lief H. and 
Thomas F. Burke. Reason in Law (7th ed.) (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 123. 
34 Horowitz, supra note 20, at 34. 
35 Chayes, Abram. “The Role of the Judge in Public Litigation,” Harvard Law Review 89 (1976): 1302.  
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 The school prayer decisions provide a fine example of bi-polarity. These cases 
were all bought to court by students of a religious minority, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
who refused to pray in school. Given the small size and extreme unpopularity of such 
groups, not to mention the political powerlessness of young students, there were no allied 
interest groups that could have influenced the Court’s policies.36 Prison reform cases, as 
disputes between prison administrators and individual prisoners with no interest groups to 
represent them, also embody the concept of bi-polarity. Courts, freed from having to 
consider the impact of their decisions on allied groups, can boost their capacity by 
focusing on the issue at hand in both types of cases. The “one-person, one-vote” doctrine 
advanced in the Supreme Court’s redistricting decisions, on the other hand, illustrates the 
difficulties judges face when issuing multi-plural rulings.  In order to comply with rulings 
such as Baker v. Carr (1962), lower courts were required to re-apportion legislative 
districts across entire states, in pursuit of “mathematical exactness” and proportional 
representation.37 By forcing the lower courts to balance the interests and voting power of 
every district in the state, the Supreme Court lowered capacity by advocating for a multi-
plural solution.38 
Capacity also raises when courts advance minimalist policies. As used by Cass 
Sunstein, minimalism encourages judges to advance a policy in small steps, over a series 
                                                
36 Dolbeare, Kenneth M., and Phillip E. Hammond. The School Prayer Decisions from Court Policy to 
Local Practice. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 58. 
37 Reynolds v. Sims (1964) at 577. 
38 Hasen, Richard L. The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality form Baker v. Carr to Bush 
v. Gore. (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 7-8. Professor Hasen suggests that courts might 
apply Cass Sunstein’s minimalism argument by protecting only “core” political-equality rights – political 
participation, competition, or equality – while leaving the rest to the legislature. As of yet, courts have not 
attempted this approach.  
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of related cases.39 By issuing “narrow, incremental” decisions instead of “broad rulings 
that the nation may later have cause to regret,” courts restrain themselves from 
invalidating too many laws, instigating too many unforeseen consequences, or requiring 
too much action on the part of the implementing populations to be feasibly enforced.40 
This minimalist rule of thumb produces effective court policies because the adversary 
legal system is much more conducive to “deciding the particular case,” rather than 
“formulating a general policy.”41 It allows judges render decisions specifically tailored to 
certain circumstances, and thereby allows them to reach the best possible outcome for 
that case. By erring on the side of caution and deciding a case solely on the issues before 
them, judges should be able narrow policies that provide maximum benefits for the target 
population with minimal government action. 
In Roe v. Wade (1974), the Supreme Court singlehandedly abolished abortion 
restrictions in forty-six states.42 Conservative religious groups across the nation rose up in 
protest when Roe was handed down. Justice Ginsburg herself has argued that had the 
Court struck down individual abortion regulations on a case-by-case basis, had they 
advanced a minimalist reform policy instead of a broad declaration, the Court could have 
avoided this incredible backlash.43 Moreover, state legislatures might have “liberalized 
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access to abortion without backlash if only the Court had stayed its hand.”44 The Justices 
learned their lesson from Roe: throwing caution to the wind in pursuit of social change 
lowers court capacity, whereas minimalist decisions raise capacity by giving the public 
time to acclimate to new judicially-mandated policies. Prison reform decisions reflect a 
higher degree of minimalism, because courts are inclined to issue remedial judicial 
decrees, commanding administrators to address a certain deficiency or terminate a certain 
practice, rather than ordering the prison system as a whole to re-invent itself.45 This 
minimalism makes the decisions easier for prison administrators to enforce.  
 Judges must also consider the degree to which their policies depend on the 
legislative and executive branches for legitimization. The judiciary largely lacks the 
power to enforce its own decisions, and a ruling that relies on extensive enforcement 
from the other branches diminishes the power judges possess over their own policies. 
Alexander Hamilton famously wrote in his Federalist Papers that the judicial branch 
“has no influence over either the sword or the purse,” and “must ultimately depend upon 
the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”46 While some 
decisions are relatively self-enforcing, it is true that “the judiciary, having no budget, no 
power to tax or to create new institutions, has much less ability to experiment or to adjust 
its techniques to the problems it confronts.”47 It should be noted that Congress faces 
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similar enforcement issues, for “implementation of statutes is far from automatic.” 48 
However, Congress at least possesses the power to levy taxes, subsidize compliance, or 
create bodies to oversee its policies, whereas courts’ “power to command consent” comes 
primarily from citizens’ continuing belief in the rule of law, the belief that judicial 
decisions are based on principles “which bind the judges as well as the litigants and apply 
consistently yesterday, today, and tomorrow.”49 Most judicial policies must therefore 
rely, at least to an extent, on the considerable enforcement mechanisms of the coordinate 
federal branches and on the compliance of local government officials. Judicial policies 
that are easily legitimized ought to be the most successful.  
 None of the policies considered here were easily legitimized. Rather, they all 
depended on co-ordinate branch enforcement. As the painful history of military 
deployment in Little Rock and the resulting Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates, 
desegregation policy relied heavily on the executive and legislative branches’ 
enforcement mechanisms.50 Redistricting policies were no easier to enforce, as they 
relied entirely on the legislature for legitimization. Legislators not only “have the power 
to determine many of the rules that govern the democratic process,” they also have 
incentive “to manipulate the rules of the game in order to forward their personal or 
partisan ambitions at the expense of the public interest.”51 The considerable power of 
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these elected officials subtracted from the Court’s legitimacy. Court rulings on school 
prayer, likewise, depended on legitimization and enforcement from school 
administrators,52 and consequentially remain unenforced in much of the country.53 
Abortion and prison reform decisions encountered the same fundamental flaw in that they 
relied on compliance from hospital and prison administrators, though this problem has 
been mitigated somewhat by the public nature of the courts’ pronouncements, and the 
courts’ ability to impose sanctions on non-compliant officials.54 In all these cases, 
however, courts’ institutional dependency on outside enforcement constrained their 
capacity to legitimize their own policy decisions. 
 In keeping with the alternativism approach, courts offer an alternate path for 
policy goals blocked by structural impediments in the other branches. Structural 
impediments, such as corruption or partisan deadlock, prevent many policies from 
making it through the legislature, but majoritarianism poses the most significant barrier. 
Minority groups who are too small or too unpopular to make their voice heard in the 
representative branches of government must take their cause to court. Judicial 
policymaking thus becomes most defensible when “courts offer the only viable path to 
                                                                                                                                            
Gerken asserts that “the self-interest of elected state legislators can undermine democratic values, and the 
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get around fundamental institutional barriers,” but most problematic when it “dilutes or 
deflects the ordinary political process.”55 When the political process provides a viable 
route to realizing policy goals, courts ought not to involve themselves. However, when 
the coordinate branches are made inoperable by structural impediments, judicial 
policymaking necessity will rise to a boiling point, and the courts will have to act.  
 In contrast to the legitimization variable, all of the policies examined here 
confronted some degree of structural impediments. Judicial action was necessary to 
advance a desegregation policy, for Southern segregationists “had an unbeatable 
filibuster in the Senate,” and President Eisenhower was loath to enter the race-relations 
battle.56 Justice Jackson was correct in stating: “if we have to decide this question, then 
representative government has failed.”57 Similarly, structural impediments are a given in 
any redistricting case. John Hart Ely and Michael Klarman used the terms “systemic 
malfunction”58 and “legislative entrenchment” 59 respectively, but both refer to instances 
when political parties remove threats to incumbents through gerrymandering and 
malapportionment. It is precisely this sort of corruption that judicial redistricting policies 
seek to prevent. Both of these policies, and many of the others, could only have been 
developed by the judicial branch due to structural impediments. The one clear exception 
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is abortion policy. Cass Sunstein posits that by 1973, “state legislatures were moving 
firmly to expand legal access to abortion,” and that Roe “may have prevented state 
legislatures from working out long-lasting solutions based upon broad public 
consensus.”60 Though state legislatures were in the process of liberalizing abortion, the 
Court’s over-eager intervention can be attributed to the structural impediments still 
remaining in the national Congress. Fearful of taking a polarizing stance on abortion, 
elected officials moved “to ensure that courts, rather than legislatures” would be “the 
forums responsible” for deciding abortion policy.61 Judicial intervention in abortion 
policy was only moderately necessary, as support for liberalized abortion was strong at 
the local level but lacking on the national stage.  
 Finally, despite the insistence that judges be kept insulated from partisan 
pressures and public opinion, judicial policies cannot survive without public support.  
Many state judges are not held accountable to the electorate, and federal judges are 
always appointees, so there is seemingly little motivation for judges to appease the 
public. However, the Supreme Court rarely resists “a really unmistakable wave of public 
sentiment” for very long.62 Swimming against the tide of public opinion, and taking 
“sustained policy position that lacks significant support outside the Court,” invites intense 
public scrutiny of judicial decisions.63 In order to maintain their legitimacy, then, courts 
must indulge public opinion by creating popularly supported policies. When public 
demand for a policy solution grows especially strong, courts will feel compelled to 
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participate in policymaking. Though there is no guarantee that courts will have high 
capacity when creating these policies, I predict that judicial policymaking necessity will 
rise in tandem with public support for court action.  
 Public support was weak for most of the policies considered here, and even when 
a majority of the nation supported judicial intervention, the minority was so vehemently 
opposed that any positive support was comparatively insignificant. For instance, although 
54% of Americans agreed with the Brown ruling, the whites who opposed it were much 
more vocal than the whites who supported it.64 Similarly, the rise of the religious right 
and Ronald Reagan’s subsequent conservative revolution in the wake of Roe indicate that 
the outraged minority shouted louder than the liberal majority.65 Other policies were met 
with majoritarian opposition from the very start. Both prisoners and religious minorities 
were so politically unpopular that judicial decisions in their favor could never garner 
public support. Tellingly, between 70 and 80 percent of Americans favored school prayer 
from 1964 to 2004, in direct opposition to judicial policies.66 The only overwhelmingly 
popular policy was redistricting, which can be attributed to citizen’s enthusiasm for 
stamping out governmental corruption.67 
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Three general conclusions can be drawn from Table 1. First, the findings suggest 
that judicial policymaking capacity is highest when court decisions protect the individual 
liberties of unpopular minorities from oppressive majorities. Despite (or perhaps because 
of) almost uniform public sentiment against the courts’ school prayer and prison reform 
decisions, judicial action was the most successful in protecting unpopular groups such as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses (who refuse to pray in school) or felons. This is indicative of what 
Professor Bickel terms the “anti-majoritarian difficulty,” or the role of the courts in 
democratic society to act as a check on popular will.68 While the policies considered here 
all concerned political minorities of some sort, be they African-Americans, women, or 
under-represented voters, it is arguable that even in the era of de jure segregation, 
African-Americans had more visibility and political clout due to the work of the NAACP 
and civil rights activists than did religious minorities or prisoners. Another by-product of 
the civil rights movement was the increased political debate over women’s rights and 
healthcare, whereas the rights of prisoners received considerably less public attention. 
This is to say, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the smaller and more helpless the minority 
plaintiff in any given case, the more apt the judiciary is at creating beneficial policy.  
 Second, some structural impediments were present in every policy area, and were 
significant in every area except abortion. Taken in conjunction with the previous 
conclusion that courts perform best when protecting minorities from hateful public 
opinion, it could easily be maintained that structural impediments determine the necessity 
of judicial policy-making, whereas public support for judicial intervention is 
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comparatively insignificant. This finding would be in keeping with the traditional 
formulation that courts are (or should be) insulated from public opinion. Judicial 
policymaking, then, appears to be most appropriate – or at least most necessary – when 
the other branches’ hands are tied. In other words, the judiciary ought to intervene in 
policymaking only as a last resort.  
 Third, bi-polar cases correlate with appropriate judicial policies.  Judges in both 
the school prayer and prison reform decisions were freed from having to concern 
themselves with the opinions of various conflicting interested parties. Neither K-12 
schoolchildren nor prisoners, after all, have powerful interest groups to lobby for their 
rights. This allows judges to focus on crafting an effective policy from constitutional 
principles, rather than compromising those principles in order to create a workable policy 
that meets the needs of many interested parties to the dispute.  
There are flaws apparent in this model. For example, the model does not consider 
that some of the six variables might carry more weight than others. Furthermore, there 
might be covariance among these variables. It is not so hard to imagine that a bi-polar 
policy might, by its very nature, invite a minimalist solution because of the fewer number 
of parties involved. Despite all efforts to the contrary, these categorical rankings, 
grounded though they are in research, are to a degree subjective assessments of policy 
effectiveness. As no readily apparent way to quantify the six variables presented itself, a 
theoretical approach to judicial intervention in the policymaking process seemed the most 
effective option. It is especially important to highlight that I do not consider these five 
policy areas from the perspective of the many groups and individuals they benefit. I do 
not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court’s Brown or Roe decisions, for instance, did 
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not bring enormous relief to populations facing severe discrimination. On the contrary, I 
would applaud the Court for taking action in these cases when the representative 
branches failed to do so. I argue only that the judiciary was not the ideal or the most 
appropriate branch to resolve these policy issues, and therefore judicial intervention in 
the policymaking process itself may not solve the dispute in the long run. While I 
recognize these constraints and invite revisions and additions to this theoretical model, 
the capacity + necessity = appropriateness model does provide a foundation for further 
developments in the field of judicial policymaking. 
 
Case Study: Affirmative Action in Education 
Having tested the model on a diverse range of policy areas, I turn to an 
assessment of judicial participation in affirmative action policymaking. Table 2 (found in 
the Appendix) applies the policymaking model to the Supreme Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence. This analysis focuses specifically on educational affirmative action 
policies, which are defined as “policies that offer individuals deemed to be affiliated with 
a beneficiary group a preference over others in competitions for,” apart from jobs and 
government contracts, “education.”69 
Two affirmative action educational policies come into focus: judicial corrections 
to higher-education admissions programs, and court-imposed busing plans for K-12 
public schools. Scholars dispute the extent of judicial involvement in both policies.  J. 
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Harvie Wilkinson argues that while busing is a “court-controlled,” “race-conscious 
remedy,” affirmative action policies in higher education are “neither court-controlled nor 
court-compelled,” because higher education institutions “voluntarily [took it upon 
themselves] to redress past racial wrongs.”70 However, this account belittles the central 
role that the judiciary played in developing higher education affirmative action. If, in the 
1970s, the Supreme Court sanctioned the consideration of race in admissions policies, 
then by the 1990s, “the Court was proscribing affirmative action plans it once 
sanctioned.”71 Regardless of whether these policies were voluntarily adopted or judicially 
mandated, both were developed and implemented by the judicial branch, acting in a non-
traditional policymaking role, and both were intended to provide minority students with 
increased access to equal educational opportunities.  
Several interesting differences between the two policy areas remain apparent. The 
Court’s higher education jurisprudence concerns individual applicants seeking admission 
to selective institutions, while its busing cases were all brought by organized groups or 
entire school districts protesting race-based school assignments. Plaintiffs in higher 
education cases typically ask the Court to strike down racial quotas; the Court, in busing 
cases, often feels compelled to do just the opposite. In the end, however, busing and 
higher education affirmative action alike aim “to overcome societal discrimination 
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affecting minorities irrespective of whether nefarious intent can be proven.”72 In its 
busing decisions, as in its higher-education adjudication, the Supreme Court sought to 
provide a remedy for the harm caused by generalized discrimination against minorities 
seeking equal access to education. Judicial involvement in higher education admissions 
and in K-12 busing plans, therefore, both conform to the above definition of educational 
affirmative action policies.   
Tracing the judicial history of these two policy areas, and comparing their 
performances in the model, will provide insight on when, or if, judicially created race-
based remedies can successfully counteract educational discrimination. While other 
policies concerning race and education, such as voucher programs, school funding 
disputes, and charter schools, were challenged in court and do merit further study, this 
analysis constrains itself to a comparison of two types of affirmative action because of 
their marked contrasts and the considerable extent of judicial involvement in forming 
both policies. 
 
Judicial Intervention in Affirmative Action 
Higher Education  
 The year 1965 marked the beginning of federal affirmative action, when Lyndon 
B. Johnson’s Executive Order No. 11246 ordered the federal government to take 
“affirmative steps” to remedy lingering effects of prior discrimination. The Supreme 
Court, however, first weighed in on the issue of affirmative action in higher education in 
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the landmark case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1977).73  Ever since 
this highly controversial decision, “it is largely the courts that have defined the 
permissible scope of affirmative action programs.”74  
 Bakke, a white male, was twice denied acceptance at the University’s medical 
school under an admissions program which reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats in 
each incoming class for minority students. Bakke alleged that the University’s affirmative 
action program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
denying him equal opportunity to attend a state school, solely on the basis of his race.  
 The Court failed to reach a majority decision, with four Justices concluding that a 
state-supported racial quota system in higher education was forbidden by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and another four holding that considering race in admission decisions is 
constitutionally permissible. Justice Powell, with one foot in both camps, wrote for the 
plurality, finding that while race could be used as one of many factors in a broader 
criteria, the use of a racial quota violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In short, Powell sympathized with the claim that the University had a 
“compelling state interest” interest in obtaining a diverse student body, but cautioned that 
this interest does not excuse higher education institutions from “treat[ing] each applicant 
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as an individual in the admissions process.”75 Race could be used as a factor in 
admissions, but not as the only or even the primary one. 
In Bakke’s wake, some institutions adopted admissions programs modeled after 
Harvard’s, which Justice Powell had praised for considering students holistically and 
recognizing that there are many types of diversity beyond race. In the absence of more 
direction from the Court, however, most admissions programs continued to operate as 
before, either in confusion over or in violation of the Bakke ruling.76 Given their 
confusing first step, it is hardly surprising that the Court continued to send contradictory 
signals about the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education. The Justices 
rejoined the battle in 2003, when they handed down two seemingly conflicting opinions 
on the same day: Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.  
Grutter concerned an applicant to the University of Michigan’s law school who 
was denied admission under a program that used race as a factor in making decisions. 
The University protested that it had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student 
body. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor found that neither the Equal Protection Clause nor 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevented the University from using race as a factor in its 
decision-making process, because diversity was a compelling state interest, the 
admissions program was narrowly tailored to realize that interest, and because it did not 
“unduly harm” non-minorities.77 In doing so, O’Connor largely followed Powell’s lead 
by reiterating the importance of diversity in higher education and upholding programs 
that did not overly burden non-minority applicants.  
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 In Gratz, a white applicant was denied admission to the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate program, which also considered race as a factor in its decision-making 
process to further the compelling interest of achieving on-campus diversity. Specifically, 
the program gave applicants a numerical score; those with scores of at least 100 were 
admitted. African-American, Hispanic, and American Indian applicants were 
automatically awarded 20 out of the 100 required points, solely on basis of their race. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist struck down Michigan’s admissions program under the 
Equal Protection Clause. Though he did not outright ban the University from considering 
diversity as a compelling interest, Rehnquist found that the program was not narrowly 
tailored, and did not sufficiently consider students at an individual level, as Justice 
Powell would have required.78  
To the Court’s credit, the Justices applied the same strict scrutiny test to Gratz 
and Grutter: in both instances, the admissions program must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve diversity without causing undue harm on non-minorities or judging students 
solely by their race, rather than by their individual achievements. However, the Court 
failed to provide any concrete sense of when programs cross the line from constitutional 
to not. The program in Gratz considered more than a student’s race; it merely gave 
minority students a “plus,” to use Justice Powell’s language.79 A big plus, to be sure, but 
a plus nonetheless, and since there were no racial quotas present, a plus to a minority 
student could hardly be construed as a “minus” to white students. Critics further 
wondered whether the Court could truly hold the Grutter and Gratz admissions policies 
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to the same standard, when the undergraduate program clearly received a proportionately 
larger number of applications, and therefore could hardly afford to compare students on a 
strictly individual basis.  
The Court’s reluctance to guide higher education institutions through these 
questions could indicate low levels of capacity, but it might also reflect a wise tendency 
for minimalism, or simply a desire to remove itself from a fiery political debate. Those 
hoping that the Court would provide more answers remained disappointed after Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (2013), which concerned a white applicant who was denied 
undergraduate admission to the University in favor of less qualified minority applicants. 
The Court was not asked to overturn Grutter – the petitioner acknowledged that diversity 
was a compelling interest – and indeed it did not. Rather, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
majority opinion insisted that “strict scrutiny must not be strict in theory but feeble in 
fact,” holding that affirmative action is constitutional only narrowly tailored and 
absolutely necessary to achieve a diverse student body. As of 2013, race can only be 
considered when there are no realistic alternative measures to create diversity on campus. 
 
Busing 
 In Brown II, the Supreme Court entrusted the task of supervising desegregation on 
the ground to the district courts. These courts, lacking direction, were soon overwhelmed 
by avoidance schemes, which eventually climbed their way back up to the Supreme 
Court. Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville (1963), for example, concerned a school 
board that unconstitutionally allowed students to transfer from a school where they were 
in the racial minority to one where they were in the racial majority. Similarly, in Green v. 
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County School Board of New Kent County, Va. (1968), the Court struck down a freedom-
of-choice plan that allowed children to choose which public school they wanted to attend. 
By the time of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), the Court 
had tired of combatting desegregation, and instead instructed local officials to do 
“whatever was necessary” to force integration.80 In this case, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger upheld the power of district judges to use busing as a remedial decree. “Once a 
right and a violation have been shown,” Burger wrote,  “the scope of a district court’s 
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad.”81 Lower courts now wielded the 
power to desegregate school districts by imposing court-created busing plans, even if 
those plans required busing children for upwards of an hour to reach a school in need of 
racial balancing.  
Opposition to busing policy was particularly harsh in Northern cities where de 
jure segregation was unknown but de facto segregation had long since resulted in 
discriminatory housing patterns. Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1973) excited outrage in 
Denver, where schools were ordered to integrate despite the fact that segregation was 
clearly a result of housing patterns, not school board bias.82 In response to this 
widespread public criticism of busing, the Court rescinded this unpopular policy in 
following cases. In Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the Court held that the predominantly 
black, inner-city Detroit public school students did not have to be bused to the suburbs, 
because school districts could not be forced to desegregate if there was no clear showing 
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of discriminatory intent.83 This decision marked a retreat for the Court, and an 
acknowledgement of the widespread public pushback against the busing doctrine. Under 
Chief Justice John Roberts, the current Court effectively put an end to racial remedies in 
K-12 public education. The Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 (2007) decision concluded that racial diversity is not a compelling interest, 
and that assigning students to public high schools in order to achieve racial balance is 
therefore unconstitutional.  
 In busing, as in higher education, the Courts’ affirmative action decisions have 
been controversial, and have called into question fundamental constitutional principles 
and American attitudes towards race. Courts, along with the rest of American society, 
continue to grapple with this history. The presence of three underlying challenges has 
limited the Court’s ability to intervene in affirmative action policymaking.   
 
Inherent Challenges 
Race-blindness vs. Race-consciousness 
The Court’s struggle to decide on a clear-cut standard for affirmative action 
policy is indicative a longer clash in American history between two sets of competing 
ideologies: race-blindness versus race-consciousness, and equality of opportunity versus 
equality of result.  
 The race-blind approach was first articulated by Justice Harlan’s famous dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896): “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens.” Harlan’s statement, though made over a century ago, is 
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echoed by Justices sitting on the same bench today. Ironically enough, Harlan’s color-
blind doctrine was originally used to argue that segregated train cars discriminated 
against black Americans, while today, the same doctrine is used as justification end forms 
of “benign” discrimination that offer advantages to blacks. In Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District (2007), Chief Justice John Roberts 
responded pointedly, “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race,” and Justice Thomas explicitly stated, “my view of 
the Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view.” Race-blindness remains an appealing 
rhetorical and conceptual approach to constitutional issues of race equality, although the 
kinds of racial discrimination that it seeks to counter have changed. 
 Proponents of race-consciousness, on the other hand, argue that law can correct 
for racial discrimination only by taking account of an individual’s race.  Justice 
Blackmun best exemplified the race-conscious approach in his Bakke 
concurrence/dissent. “In order to treat certain persons equally,” he wrote, “we must treat 
them differently.”84 Subscribers to this approach see affirmative action as a remedy for 
institutionalized racism or vestiges of prior discrimination, and believe “benign” 
discrimination policies are constitutionally acceptable. While its opponents warn judges 
not to force distinctions between equal citizens, race-conscious advocates point out that 
“laws,” by their very nature, “classify.”85 For example, the Supreme Court itself 
considers race to be a more protected class than sex, and thus holds race-based 
classifications to a higher standard of constitutional scrutiny. If laws and judges both sort 
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individuals into classes, and treat those classes differently under the law, then why should 
law not benefit those who are most often the targets of social discrimination?  
 The ideological debate between race-blindness and race-consciousness poses a 
particular challenge to the Court’s capacity because both philosophies constantly evolve, 
keeping in pace with America’s evolving understanding of race in society. Though both 
rooted firmly in precedent, these two approaches were developed in different centuries, in 
opposition to different racial issues.  Race-blindness may have been the right choice in 
1896, and race-consciousness may have worked well in 1978, but neither approach may 
be suitable for the present day. The Court, an institution that always looks backwards to 
find the way forward, struggles to articulate an effective approach to modern-day 
discrimination.   
 
Equality of Opportunity vs. Equality of Result 
A study by Gamson and Modigliani in 1987 found that the public sees affirmative 
action through one of two frames: 1) opposition to preferential treatment, or 2) remedial 
action to compensate for institutional racism.86  These two frameworks correspond 
exactly to the race-blind and race-conscious arguments advanced by the Justices, 
respectively. This is a debate that not only encompasses competing visions of race, but 
competing visions of equality: equality of opportunity and equality of result.  
Those who believe in the equality of opportunity might oppose affirmative action, 
because everyone should have an equal opportunity to attend college, be hired for a job, 
or be granted a government contract. If some are favored over others due to their race or 
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gender, then people are not being given an equal chance, and the ones who rise to the top 
will not necessarily be the most deserving.  Those who believe in equality of result, by 
contrast, will support giving preferential treatment to those who have been discriminated 
against, believing that the lingering effects of prior discrimination will prevent those 
groups from having truly equal access to scarce admissions slots or jobs. By 
compensating to an extent for this innate disadvantage, preferential treatment can lead to 
greater social equality.87   
In the American tradition, the former conception of equality is heavily favored 
over the later: all three branches of government have explicitly endorsed the equality of 
opportunity ideal.88 American’s national narrative emphasizes “pulling yourself up by 
your bootstraps,” rugged individualism, and the free-market ideal that the hardest-
working and most deserving members of society will be the most successful, regardless 
of the challenges they face. The difficulty remains, however, that affirmative action 
brings into conflict two ideals of what equality should mean.89 This is not a clash between 
two different rights, such as the fight between the right to privacy and the right to life that 
framed the abortion debate. Instead, judges are forced to say what equality is and what it 
is not, both defining the term and finding a place for it in the Constitution. This becomes 
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all the more difficult because “[judges] ought to be especially careful not to impose on 
the states particular conceptions of equality that are not constitutionally mandated.”90 By 
imposing their own visions of equality, judges must endure higher levels of scholarly and 
public scrutiny whenever they wade into the affirmative action debate.  
 
Judicial Inconsistency 
The most enduring critique of the Court’s rulings on affirmative action in higher 
education is that they are nebulous at best, disorienting at worst.91 The failure to insist on 
a single, clear-cut rule or policy has left many observers confused as to what 
differentiates a constitutional affirmative action admissions plan from a prohibited one, 
which, in turn, has limited the Court’s capacity to sway public opinion.92 These decisions 
are also indicative of the Court’s long struggle to guarantee the equality of all races at all 
levels of public education. Intriguingly, while the Court forbids racial quotas to attain 
diversity in higher education, it had no problem imposing racial quotas on elementary and 
secondary education to further school desegregation. Whereas racial assignments in K-12 
schools necessarily reduce students’ identity to their racial groups, higher education 
affirmative action policy encourages admissions staff to consider an individual’s race as 
only one factor in making admissions decisions. Inconsistencies such as these cause 
public confusion and lend ammunition to the Court’s critics, thereby inhibiting judicial 
power. 
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Having addressed these limitations on courts’ ability to resolve affirmative action 
disputes, I turn to the comparative case study. Table 2, in the Appendix, applies the 
model to judicial policymaking in higher education and busing.  
 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
 Justices ruling on higher education affirmative action cases are asked, at some 
point, to determine whether or not a rejected applicant deserves admittance to a higher 
education institution. “Courts,” Gerald Rosenberg argues, “encounter particular 
difficulties when they try to reshape highly complicated institutions,” because they lack 
institutional expertise.93 When determining whether Bakke ought to be admitted to the 
UC Davis medical school, for instance, the Court needed review Bakke’s application, 
compare it to competing applications, and assess the schools admissions program as a 
whole. The Court must, in short, perform the tasks assigned to the institution’s own 
trained admissions staff. “Judges are trained in the law,” as judges themselves point out, 
“they are not penologists, psychiatrists, public administrators, or educators.”94 The Court 
is nevertheless asked to go beyond its generalist knowledge in crafting higher education 
policy, an area of which it knows nothing.  
 As a conflict between a school and a rejected white applicant, higher education 
affirmative action cases seem bipolar. However, this first impression conveys anything 
but the truth, because every student or applicant to the institution has a vested interest in 
the school’s admissions policy, as do the students’ future employers. The widespread 
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public interest and debate over affirmative action cases “climaxed a trend toward public 
litigation.”95 In the Bakke case alone, a record-setting fifty-eight briefs were filed,96 a 
record smashed by the 200-plus briefs submitted in the companion cases Grutter and 
Gratz. The fact that everyone from the U.S. military to General Motors filed an amicus 
brief illustrates the multi-plurality of these decisions. 
 The Court advanced its higher education policy incrementally, largely due to the 
Justices’ own inability to agree on what standard of constitutional scrutiny to apply to 
affirmative action cases.97 The Justices’ lack of cohesion resulted in many split decisions, 
“often without majority support for the reasoning upholding the decisions, and with sharp 
differences among the Justices.”98 Unable to speak in unison, the Court could not take a 
strong stance on affirmative action, leaving school admissions officers themselves with 
considerable power to decide the impact of the Court’s policies.99 For instance, educators 
estimated that after the Bakke decision, 90% of existing higher education admissions 
programs remained constitutional under Justice Powell’s test.100 Intentionally or not, the 
Court minimized the breadth and sweep of its own opinions through in-fighting, 
compromise, and deference to the implementing populations. This is a fortunate 
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occurrence, as “it would be a democratic disaster if the Court were to issue a broad ruling 
that foreclosed democratic debate” on so salient an issue as affirmative action.101 
 The Court’s rulings have done little to stifle public debate over affirmative action 
in higher education, and several states have not been shy to fight back against the Court’s 
tolerance for minority-preference programs. California’s Proposition 209, passed in 1996, 
states: “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to any 
individual or group on the basis of race [in] public education.” Similarly, state 
legislatures have pushed back against Court rulings that validate considering race as a 
factor in admissions, with Texas and Florida adopting “Top 10 Percent” plans to 
automatically grant admissions to students graduating in the top 10 percent of their high 
school class, regardless of their race.102 Higher education institutions, by contrast, have 
rarely fought the Supreme Court’s decisions outright, choosing instead to superficially 
modify their unconstitutional admissions programs, or maintain them in secret. “Virtually 
all universities and professional schools,” after the Bakke decision, “maintained their 
program for minority admissions,” and secured “roughly the same percentage of minority 
students each year.”103 Whether through direct confrontation or indirect avoidance, 
officials at the local level have not legitimized the Court’s rulings. 
On a national level, however, the legislative and executive branches have deferred 
to the Court where affirmative action is concerned. No President has taken a strong 
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stance on affirmative action in higher education, wary of ensuing controversy. Even the 
Reagan administration’s opposition to affirmative action policy prompted only a change 
in the rhetoric of affirmative action, not a change in affirmative action policy itself.104 
Bill Clinton’s “low-key”105 approach to affirmative action could be summed up by his 
“mend it, don’t end it”106 philosophy. George W. Bush also chose to follow the Court’s 
lead: he “applauded the Supreme Court” on maintaining the “careful balance between the 
goal of campus diversity and the fundamental principle of equal treatment under the law” 
after the Grutter and Gratz decisions. The executive branch, clearly, has been willing to 
step aside and allow the Court to set the boundaries of affirmative action policy. 
 Congress, like the executive branch, elected to remain on the sidelines while the 
Court waded deeper and deeper into affirmative action juridification. Despite several 
opportunities to ban affirmative action, Congress consistently declined to do so. In fact, 
to this day, “Congress has failed to reverse any of the Supreme Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence.”107 The executive and legislative branches alike have not challenged the 
Court’s authority, but they have also stopped short of aiding the Court in its mission, 
except for carefully calculated endorsements of the Court’s compromising decisions like 
Grutter and Gratz. Legitimization of the Court’s higher education policy, lacking at the 
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local level and cautiously supported at the national level, indicates a moderate record of 
success for the Court’s higher education decisions. 
 Despite the relative lack of action on the part of the coordinate branches, there is 
no discernable reason why the judiciary needed to intervene in higher education 
policymaking, especially considering the Court’s indecisiveness as to the constitutionality 
of race-conscious admissions programs. Disgruntled, rejected applicants face an uphill 
battle in gaining admission to the school of their choice without court-orders, but there 
are other options available to them. Voters in California and state legislatures in Florida 
and Texas, for example, have proven sympathetic to demands to re-think affirmative 
action in higher education.108 The coordinate branches’ reluctance to engage in 
affirmative action policymaking, then, is more a function of their willingness to let the 
judiciary bear the burden than it is evidence of structural impediments. 
 Nor has there been widespread public support for judicial intervention in 
affirmative action. The American public (like the Justices of the Supreme Court) seems 
unable to decide if affirmative action in higher education should stay or go, thus limiting 
their ability to demand a judicial answer. A 1977 Gallup Poll conducted concurrently 
with the Bakke case found that while Americans oppose “preferential treatment” through 
affirmative action, they largely favored other publicly financed means of aiding 
minorities.109 The same internal conflict remains apparent today. Despite consistently 
documenting opposition to formal racial discrimination, studies conducted concurrently 
with Grutter and Gratz found that only 35 percent of Americans thought that race should 
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be considered in college admissions, whereas 60 percent believed that admissions should 
be based entirely on merit. 110 Americans seem to desire equal opportunity of access to 
higher education in theory, but are unwilling to implement it in practice. Or possibly, 
they disagree on the true definition of “equal opportunity.” Either way, “in 2006, as in 
1978, most Americans favor equal rights and equal opportunity, but they oppose the use 
of preferential treatment for particular groups to achieve those ideals.”111 These 
conflicting feelings suggest moderate public support for affirmative action in higher 
education, perhaps pressuring the Court into taking its middle-of-the-road approach in 
Bakke, and preventing it from killing affirmative action in Fischer.    
 In the aggregate, the appropriateness of judicial intervention in higher education 
affirmative action is moderate-low. 
 
Affirmative Action in K-12 Busing 
 The Court’s busing decisions in cases like Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education arose out of the need to force school districts to comply with 
desegregation. The judicial takeover of bus routes, which had previously been set by 
democratically accountable school board representatives, was expensive, involuntary, and 
inconvenient.112   
Not only were local courts unaccountable to the public, they had no experience in 
creating integration plans and were thus forced to rely on social science evidence to 
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justify busing and racial quotas. While “it would be an exaggeration to say [the social 
sciences] are responsible for the busing dilemmas facing so many communities today,” 
social science research has “been inextricably interwoven with policy decisions.”113 Early 
social science evidence persuaded the Justices “that the mixing of the races in itself will 
invariably have positive educational and social consequences,”114 and a 1967 
Commission on Civil Rights report instructed policymakers “to permit no school to be 
more than 50 percent black.”115 Findings such as these “urged government to reassign 
pupil populations on the basis of race” through busing policies,116 but many public 
schools today remain de facto segregated and no study has ever proved ‘that integration 
has had an effect on [minority] academic achievement as measured by standardized 
tests.”117 Scholars charge that courts’ obsession “with questions of quantity rather than 
quality, with mathematical rations, quotas and balance, rather than with the educational 
process itself,” has caused more harm than good to students of both races, and has done 
little “to translate desegregation into integration,” the true task at hand.118 These realities 
depict the Court’s difficulty in interpreting social science data and grounding its decisions 
on such evidence. In its pursuit of statistical racial balance, the Supreme Court violated 
the principle of generalism by relying primarily on social facts, rather than on 
constitutional principles, to justify its busing policy. 
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The drawing of new bus routes for every student within a de facto segregated 
district also required courts to balance a plurality of interests. The distance that each 
individual student within the district would be required to travel now factored into 
judicial decisions. Busing was no bi-polar conflict, but a policy that affected everyone, 
and “everyone suspected that they, personally, bore the brunt of the busing.”119 
As courts grew ever more insistent on using racial quotas to achieve balance in 
public schools, it became clear that schools themselves were not always the ones 
responsible for causing segregation. Rather, “it was simply school racial separation or 
imbalance itself, however caused, that had become unconstitutional.”120 Determined to 
integrate schools where no proof of racial discrimination or transgression could be found, 
the Court moved further and further away from minimalism. Tackling de jure segregation 
in Brown v. Board was challenging enough, but dealing with subtler de facto segregation 
required ever more complex busing schemes, as school districts remained stubbornly 
segregated due to housing discrimination and “white flight.” The Court recognized the 
enormity of the task it faced when asked to integrate the predominantly black Detroit 
public schools in Milliken v. Bradley (1974), holding that school districts could only be 
made to desegregate upon proof of racist intent. This decision was a retreat for the Court, 
a realization that its busing policy was not minimalist, and thereby difficult to enforce in 
the face of public opposition.121  
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Under the supervision of district courts, school boards were forced to comply with 
judicial busing policy, but the degree of implementation varied across the nation.122 
District courts lacked legitimacy when they assumed control of bus routes, because bus 
routes were traditionally “democratically conceived and democratically implemented” by 
the democratically elected school board.123 Judicially imposed busing plans were not only 
inconvenient; they were also contrary to democratic principles. Max Weber, Seymour 
Martin Lipset, and others have argued that government derives its legitimacy from public 
perceptions that the political system is acting appropriately.124 Since the unelected 
Justices took un-democratic action by imposing a policy that interfered with Americans’ 
daily lives, and which few Americans wanted in the first place, the Court reached far 
beyond its accepted boundaries. At its best, argues Martin Shapiro, “judicial 
policymaking contributes to well-rounded representation of interests or to popular 
control.”125 Court-created busing plans contributed to neither, costing courts a large 
measure of legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the Court was forced to rely on both local courts and school boards 
to enforce its busing requirements. To be effective, the Court must communicate its 
policy goals to both groups clearly (to prevent misinterpretation) and persuasively (to 
prevent avoidance.) Supreme Court decisions can be difficult for even other judges to 
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interpret. The Swann decision, for example, “although unanimous, was rather 
confusing.”126 The decision affirmed the district courts’ power to achieve integration 
through busing, but stated that “no rigid rules can be laid down to govern conditions in 
different localities;” that the “very limited use of the racial ratio” could be used only “as a 
starting point in shaping a remedy;” and that the “limits on travel time will vary with 
many factors.”127 Lower courts were understandably confused by such vague 
guidelines.128 While “most judges accord the Court considerable authority,” the same 
cannot be said for the school administrators, for “administrative agencies are somewhat 
removed from the judicial system,” and so “the Court’s authority tends to decline as 
organizational distance from the Court increases.”129 Since the effectiveness of the 
Court’s busing policy depended on a long chain of compliance from other courts and 
administrators, the policy’s legitimacy was impaired from the start.  
The representative branches of government, had they led the charge on public 
school integration, would have at least avoided the anti-democratic drawbacks of court-
imposed busing. However, once the judiciary affirmed the power of district courts to 
supervise busing plans, the coordinate branches faced a choice between supporting a 
wildly unpopular policy and using courts as a scapegoat for political gain. The choice 
was easy. For school administrators, implementing court busing plans both “threatened to 
                                                
126 Johnson and Canon, supra note 122, at 49. 
127 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), 3. 
128 The Court’s vague commands left also much discretion in the hands of local judges and officials, with 
the result that the degree of tolerable racial imbalance varied widely from city to city, district to district. 
Boston allowed a deviation of plus or minus 10% of proportional racial representation; Denver, 15%. St. 
Louis and Detroit public school student body was roughly 75% black. These cities sought to achieve a 
50/50 balance between white and black students. Armor, David J. Forced Justice. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 158-160. 
129 Baum, supra note 30, at 241, 238. 
53 
 
erode the [school] board’s local standing” and “required expenditures the school system 
could ill afford.”130 For state legislators, meanwhile, the goal was to gain votes through 
inciting indignation over busing schemes handed down from up high.131 Even at the 
federal level, coordinate branch support of court busing policy was lacking. Congress 
sought to “prohibit federal agencies from requiring school busing for desegregation” 
starting in 1968, and continued to “limit the issuance of busing orders by federal courts” 
after Swann.132 School boards and legislatures alike were unwilling to force school 
integration, but only too willing to capitalize on the political gains of un-democratic 
judicial intervention. With overwhelming evidence that courts were ill-suited to create 
busing schemes, the presence of these structural impediments meant that courts were also 
the only ones willing to do so. 
Parents, black and white, were outraged at the idea of their children being bused 
across the city to improve racial balance when there were schools half a mile from home. 
A Gallup Poll from 1970 found that only 14% of adults supported busing for the purpose 
of racial integration, whereas 81% were opposed.133 While much of the opposition came 
from whites, black families were also frustrated with busing plans. Inevitably, the bulk of 
the busing burden was placed on them, as black students were bused further away from 
home in response to “white flight” from predominantly black areas.134 Justice Thomas’s 
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concurring opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins (1995) gave voice to this sentiment by 
condemning “the idea that any school that is black is inferior, and that blacks cannot 
succeed without the benefit of the company of whites.”135 Unfavorable to both white and 
black parents, court-created busing policy received pitiful levels of public support.  
In sum, the appropriateness of court intervention in remedying school 
discrimination through busing policy is low.  
 
Findings ! The model makes it clear that the judiciary’s higher education affirmative action 
policies enjoyed comparatively more success than their K-12 busing plans. But what 
causes the disparity in effectiveness between the two types of affirmative action cases? 
The most obvious explanation for the difference is the fact that higher-education 
affirmative action cases involve a simpler remedy, and a smaller number of students and 
adults. In cases such as Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, and Fischer, the Court has been able to 
remedy any injury caused to an applicant by ordering their admission and invalidating 
whichever parts of a university’s admission plan it deems unconstitutional. Other 
schools’ admission programs might have to be amended as well, but that is a task for the 
schools themselves, not for the Court. In K-12 integration cases, however, the injury of 
segregation cannot be cured until an entire school district, or even a metropolitan area, 
has been integrated through proportional-representation plans which the courts must 
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create, direct, enforce, and constantly re-evaluate.136 At the end of the day, busing policy 
simply affects more students than higher education policy, and there are correspondingly 
more students in need of a remedy for racial discrimination. This economic and social 
reality warrants a massive policy remedy beyond judicial purview. Courts “lack the tools 
to deal effectively with these ‘relatively uncontrollable social and environmental factors,” 
and providing a more taxing remedy to a greater number of injured parties only requires 
more effort on the part of the judiciary and the coordinate branches.137  
Ironically, although the Supreme Court put an early end to racial quotas in higher 
education, the courts’ strive to meet racial quotas bogged down their K-12 busing 
jurisprudence. This sort of affirmative action – literally taking affirmative steps to 
integrate schools, rather than simply negating pre-existing unconstitutional admission 
programs – naturally requires more effort and a greater degree of policy-making from the 
judiciary. In short, the courts might be biting off more than they can chew in their pursuit 
of racial balance in public schools, because the remedies required are more drastic.  
 It is, of course, impossible to overlook the racial dimension of these decisions. All 
of the higher education cases here examined were bought by white claimants, alleging 
some form of reverse discrimination at the hands of biased admissions programs. By 
contrast, the principle issue in the K-12 affirmative action cases was the discrimination 
that African-American students suffered under segregation. It is entirely plausible that 
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white Americans would be more supportive of a court decision that requires suspect 
admissions programs to overcome a strict scrutiny test than a decision that requires racial 
balancing in public schools. As a result, judicially-mandated affirmative action might 
find more support among whites in higher education than in K-12 schooling. 
 A clear but overlooked difference between higher education and K-12 affirmative 
action cases is that all the universities at issue here are competitive institutions. Students 
compete vigorously for admission, but the universities themselves also compete to attract 
qualified minority students.138 Public schools, facing the obligation to educate every 
student within the district, have no incentive to attract more. This could explain 
administrative reluctance to comply with an integration plan that would entrust more 
students, particularly minority students, to their responsibility.  A court decision allowing 
a graduate school to continue operating essentially as before, with a reminder not to put 
too much weight on an applicant’s race, invites no administrative deliberations, creates 
no financial strife, and requires no external oversight to enforce.  Such a decision 
involves far less legitimization.  
 In sum, Table 2 offers three explanations for the relative success of judicial 
involvement in higher education when compared to K-12 court-ordered busing. The first 
proffered explanation highlights the importance of the minimalism variable – a judicial 
policy that is sweeping in scope will have less success than a narrow decision with a 
constrained impact. The second places more emphasis on the public support variable, for 
if public opinion runs contrary to a court decision, any judicially-mandated policy will be 
a bitter pill to swallow. The third explanation stresses the legitimacy variable. If the 
                                                
138 Leiter & Leiter, supra note 72, at 143. 
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implementing populations and administrative organizations refuse to comply with court 
policies, the policy is hindered from the start. These three variables have caused the 
difference in appropriateness between the courts’ higher education and K-12 affirmative 
action policies. In order to be most appropriate, future court decisions addressing race 
and equal access to education might take care to minimize their own impact, and to foster 
consensus among the public and education administrators.  
 
Conclusion 
 ! This thesis, acting under the realist assumption that judges routinely engage in 
policy creation, sought to identify the circumstances or factors that lead to appropriate 
judicial policymaking. Appropriateness, a measure of whether judicial intervention in the 
policymaking process was conducive to enduring policy solutions, was operationalized as 
a combination of the judiciary’s capacity to solve a policy dispute, and the necessity of a 
judicial answer to a policy problem. In other words, I predicted judicial intervention 
would be most appropriate when courts were both compelled to intervene in 
policymaking and were able to arrive at informed and enforceable policy decisions.   
 To develop this theory, I proposed an analytical model that outlines six elements 
of an appropriate judicial policy decision: 1) a decision that relies on generalized 
knowledge rather than complex social or technical information, 2) a bi-polar dispute 
involving two clearly defined and limited parties, 3) a minimalist decision that invalidates 
the fewest number of pre-existing statutes or advances the fewest number of new 
responsibilities or policies, 4) a decision that does not rely to a considerable extent on 
coordinate branches of government or implementing populations for legitimization, 5) a 
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decision that is made necessary by structural impediments preventing the representative 
branches from taking action, and 6) a decision that has widespread public support. 
Combining these variables from the scholarly literature offers a nuanced understanding of 
judicial involvement in any given area of public policy. A court decision that conforms to 
these parameters should be easily enforceable, highly suited to remedy specific public 
policy grievances, and welcomed as a wise and necessary use of judicial review. In short, 
such a decision is appropriate because it is conducive to an enduring policy solution. 
 After applying this model to various areas of judicial policymaking, I extended it 
to a policy area that has not been given adequate attention, namely, the appropriateness of 
court policies proscribing race-based remedies in education. A multitude of judicial 
policies involve race and education, including school vouchers, school funding, and the 
charter school movement. While these policies ought to be explored in further work, I 
focused on affirmative action in higher education and busing in K-12 schools. I did so for 
two reasons. First, the judiciary played a fundamental role in advancing and determining 
the constitutional scope of these policies from their inception, while the other branches 
largely chose to remain above the fray. This allowed me to more easily isolate and 
analyze the impact of judicial intervention in the policymaking process. Second, although 
both policies qualify as affirmative action policies by seeking to remedy mass social 
discrimination, the two are in many ways perfect contrasts. In higher education 
jurisprudence, the courts focus on individual plaintiffs; busing cases concern entire 
school districts. In higher education, courts struck down racial quotas; in busing, courts 
mandated racial balancing through quota systems. In higher education, judges are able to 
offer a simpler remedy through a judicial decree ordering an applicant’s admission; in 
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busing, no such easy fix exists. These key differences offered an opportunity to draw 
interesting conclusions through a comparative case study of affirmative action policies.  
This comparative analysis highlighted that the Court’s approach to affirmative 
action in higher education proved more minimalist, easier to legitimize, and more in step 
with public opinion than the Court’s use of busing as a remedy for segregated schools. 
Table 2 considers these three variables to be the most significant. However, the findings 
from Table 1 suggest that judicial policymaking is most appropriate when it protects 
political minorities that bring bi-polar disputes, that face public opposition, and that have 
no means of scaling the structural impediments present in the co-ordinate branches.  
This analysis has troubling implications for those hopeful that court intervention 
in affirmative action can produce enduring policy solutions. Both busing and higher 
education affirmative action cases involve a vast number of students or interested 
peripheral groups, so neither can be considered bi-polar. The Court faces considerable 
challenges when resolving such multi-plural disputes, for these policies affect the lives of 
too many students, families, and other interested parties to be effectively imposed by a 
non-democratic institution. The legitimacy of the Court’s decisions, and its capacity to 
make those decisions, suffers as a consequence.139  
The necessity of judicial involvement in higher education affirmative action also 
becomes suspect. The absence of structural impediments raises the question of why the 
judiciary needed to intervene in the first place when most higher education institutions 
                                                
139 Jesse Choper asserts that “the people’s reverence and tolerance is not infinite and the Court’s public 
prestige and institutional capital is exhaustible.” If the Court overdraws its legitimacy, its capacity is 
impaired, “inducing popular disregard of the Court’s decisions or inspiring political forces to seek to bring 
it to heel.” Choper, supra note 2, at 139-140. 
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already were and have continued to operate under admission plans that give some form of 
preference, directly or indirectly, to racial minorities. Busing policy, for all its faults, can 
at least be justified as necessary due to structural impediments and the coordinate 
branches’ passivity towards true racial integration in K-12 schools. However, the Court 
pulled back on busing policy in the face of public opposition, as demonstrated by cases 
like Milliken and Parents Involved. If the Justices’ lack of cohesion impeded their ability 
to lead public opinion on higher education affirmative action in any meaningful direction, 
then their submission to public opinion ultimately killed busing.  
The courts ought to be applauded for taking a stand on racial equality in 
education. Their willingness to confront a thorny problem that the representative 
branches prefer to duck at least put the issue “on the national policy agenda so that other 
policy makers and the general public” might take action.140 Nevertheless, the courts took 
a weak stance instead of a strong one. For supporters of affirmative action, courts have 
done little more than allow for its continued existence under confusing and rather 
arbitrary standards. For its opponents, the judiciary has accomplished nothing by banning 
racial quotas or point systems but allowing other types of affirmative action to flower. In 
sum, American education today very much resembles American education in 1970, 
before the judiciary’s immersion in affirmative action: largely stratified along race and 
class lines, in spite of all the rhetoric of the compelling interest in diversity. The Court’s 
contributions to affirmative action policy do not seem appropriate so much as they seem 
irrelevant.  
                                                
140 Baum, supra note 30, at 267.  
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  Judicial policymaking warrants further scholarly exploration, and the model 
presented in this thesis merits further development. The relative importance of capacity 
when compared to necessity, for instance, is a vital question not considered here. 
Capacity, necessity, and appropriateness could all be operationalized to test different 
hypotheses. Following Lawrence Baum’s suggestion that courts play a vital 
policymaking role by directing policymaker’s attention to certain issues, appropriateness 
could be measured by the number of new statutes re-affirming a judicial policy decree. In 
a similar vein, Jesse Choper’s theory that courts have a finite amount of legitimacy has 
interesting implications for capacity: at what level of legitimacy does capacity begin to 
crumble, and does high capacity necessarily correlate with high legitimacy? Finally, the 
comparative affirmative action case study could be expanded to include racial 
preferences in employment and contracts, which conceivably could alter the conclusions 
the judiciary’s policies involving race-based remedies. Within the realm of race and 
education specifically, there are further policies that could also be explored, namely 
judicial involvement in vouchers, charter schools, and school funding disputes.  
 Alexis de Tocqueville remarked that political questions inevitably become 
judicial ones in the United States. I would add that judicial questions are occasionally 
answered by judicial policies. In the majority of cases here examined, judicial 
policymaking is seriously constrained, and judges must exercise caution when 
substituting their decisions for popularly elected policies. This holds especially true for 
multi-plural cases, and when structural impediments are not prevalent in the 
representative branches. This is not to say that judges have no role to play in the creation 
of policy in a representative democracy, nor that the courts should hesitate to rule on vital 
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policy issues of concern to the public; only that judicial policymaking will be most 
appropriate when used to help discrete and insular minorities obtain the specific relief 
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